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From a Patent Market for Lemons to a 
Marketplace for Patents: Benchmarking IP in 
Its Evolution to Asset Class Status  
Ian D. McClure* 
INTRODUCTION 
An emphasis on strategic patent management as an 
independent business operation has created a sophisticated 
patent intermediary and services market over the past ten years, 
spurring an influx of patent service firms and tools which make 
patent research a more manageable endeavor.1 In that same time 
period, intermediaries, brokers, agents, and other non-practicing 
entities (NPEs)—patent holding companies without operations 
independent of patent monetization—have entered the patent 
market in search of high-margin returns. The concurrent timing 
of both phenomena is a result of the interrelated upward swing of 
IP value and risk.  
The value of intangible assets (of which intellectual property 
is a component) relative to other corporate assets has ballooned 
from 20% to 80% of corporate value since 1975.2 Supporting the 
proximate accuracy of this measurement is the incredible 
 
* Ian D. McClure is an experienced corporate, M&A, and intellectual property 
transactions attorney and licensing professional. He is a member of the “IAM Strategy 
300 – The World’s Leading IP Strategists” (IAM Magazine) and an adjunct faculty 
member at Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.A. in Economics from Vanderbilt University 
(cum laude), J.D. from Chapman University Fowler School of Law (magna cum laude), 
and L.L.M. from DePaul University College of Law. Special thank you to Kelly O’Neil, 
J.D. and Masters in Intellectual Property Management and Markets at Chicago-Kent 
College of Law, for her helpful research and analysis in support of this article. 
 1 James Malackowski, The Next Big Thing in Monetizing IP: A Natural Progression 
to Exchange-Traded Units, LANDSLIDE, May/June 2011, at 32, 32–37 (summarizing IP 
intermediary market development); see also Steve Lohr, Patent Auctions Offer Protections 
to Inventors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2009, at B1 (stating that the IP market has 
experienced “[a] flurry of new companies and investment groups [looking] to buy, sell, 
broker, license and auction patents”). 
 2 Intangible Asset Market Value, OCEAN TOMO, http://www.oceantomo.com/2011-
intangible-market-value/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (“Within the last quarter century, the 
market value of the S&P 500 companies has deviated greatly from their book value. This 
‘value gap’ indicates that physical and financial accountable assets reflected on a 
company’s balance sheet comprises less than 20% of the true value of the average firm. 
Our further research shows that a significant portion of this intangible value is 
represented by patented technology.”). 
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increase in patent filings over the same time period.3 Specifically, 
four times more patent applications were filed in 2012 than in 
1975.4 This has resulted in an increased focus on IP protection, 
as is evidenced by the steady rise in patent litigation since 1990,5 
capped by an unprecedented 30% increase in patent litigation 
filings in 2012 to reach 5000 patent suits filed in a year for the 
first time in history.6  
The rise in patent litigation filings evidences increased risk 
to operating entities. Moreover, infringement damages awards 
continue to break records, and 2012 was again a benchmark year 
with multiple billion-dollar awards.7 As the demand for 
competent patent attorneys to enforce or defend these actions has 
increased, the fixed costs of patent litigation remain high.8 These 
typically unplanned expenses and potential liabilities do in fact 
move the needle for shareholders9 and can result in company 
downfall or, more frequently, in restricted patent filings to 
account for the cost.10 As a result, this author has pointed out in 
 
 3 PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. 
PATENT STATISTICS CHART CALENDAR YEARS 1963–2013, [hereinafter U.S. PATENT 
& TRADEMARK OFFICE] available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us 
_stat.pdf (showing that utility patent application filings actually decreased year to year in 
1977, 1978, 1979, 1983, 1991, 1996, 2008, and 2009, but continued their overall upward 
trajectory nonetheless); see also Robert Sterne & Trevor Chaplick, Why Directors Must 
Take Responsibility for Intellectual Property, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. MAG., Feb./Mar. 2005, 
at 16, 16–24, available at http://www.skgf.com/uploads/24/doc/Why_Directors_Must_Take 
_Responsiblity_PDF.pdf (“The role of IP in certain industry sectors was much less 
prominent a decade ago. . . . Today all industry sectors embrace IP.”).  
 4  U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 3.  
 5 Sterne & Chaplick, supra note 3, at 20. 
 6 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: BIG CASES 
MAKE HEADLINES, WHILE PATENT CASES PROLIFERATE 3 (2013), available at http://pwc.to/ 
1rMmST6.  
 7 Id.  
 8 See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2013, 
at 24–27 (2013); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD 
HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 26 (2013) (commenting on the cost of patent litigation 
and providing a helpful aggregation of research). 
 9 See NAM SANGJUN & NAM CHANGI, THE IMPACT OF PATENT LITIGATION ON 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE IN THE IT INDUSTRY 4–5 (2012), available at http://econstor.eu/ 
bitstream/10419/72514/1/742699536.pdf (“Bhagat, Bizjak and Coles (1998), using an event 
study, showed that the wealth effect of patent litigation is negative for defendant firms 
and insignificant for plaintiff firms. Lerner (1995) investigated the wealth effect of patent 
litigation on biotechnology firms and found a negative effect on stock prices. Bessen and 
Meurer (2007) examined the negative impact of a patent lawsuit on shareholder value 
using a large sample based on the date of the filing of the lawsuit for US public firms from 
1984 to 1999. The results showed that the patent litigation filing announcement has a 
negative effect on defendant firms, after controlling certain factors pertaining to firm 
characteristics.”). 
 10 See Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact on American Innovation & Jobs, and 
Potential Solutions: Hearing on H.R. 845 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th 
Cong. 11 (2013) [hereinafter Hearing on Abusive Patent Litigation] (statement of Mark 
Chandler, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Cisco Systems Inc.).  
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a separate article that reasonable arguments exist that the 
responsibility for managing this risk should go to the level 
responsible for guarding shareholder value: the board of 
directors.11 In any case, the rise in risk, value, and cost has 
created a perfect storm for successful exploitation by NPEs and 
other investors.  
The rise in patent value and risk has been evidenced through 
the transaction market as well. Compared with two decades ago, 
private patent transactions continue to increase in volume and 
evolve in sophistication.12 This Article will detail particularly 
noteworthy transactions that provide perspective for this market 
evolution. The point of emphasis for the purposes of this Article, 
however, is that despite growth in the patent transaction market, 
it remains a private transaction market today.13 This 
circumstance, coupled with the current litigation environment, 
provides advantages for certain types of NPEs and investors 
looking to deal in a particularly low-quality brand of patent.14 
This consequence will be discussed in more detail later. 
The recent developments in the IP market track a familiar 
course charted by other asset classes through their recognition, 
 
 11 Ian D. McClure, Accountability in the Patent Market: A Duty to Monitor Patent 
Risk from the Boardroom, 31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. (forthcoming May 2015) (on 
file with author). 
 12 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. (WIPO), INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY (ICT) STRATEGY 5 (2013) (“For instance, demand for 
patents increased across the world from around 800,000 patent applications in the early 
1980s to 1.8 million by 2009, with the greatest increase in demand occurring as of the 
mid-1990s. Trademark applications show a similar evolution due to an increased 
emphasis on brand distinction in both domestic and global markets. These trends are 
likely to continue for the foreseeable future.”). 
 13 See Ian McClure, A Market-Based Alternative to Patent System Challenges, WIPO 
MAG., Feb. 2014, at 23, 23 available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/wipo_maga 
zine/en/pdf/2014/wipo_pub_121_2014_01.pdf (“Over the last decade, the market for 
patents has flourished. Patent intermediaries, brokers and other agents have developed a 
liquidity pool for patents and patent rights, including license rights, covenants not to sue 
and other hybrids. These products are marketed, sold, purchased, bartered, exchanged, 
traded, consorted, leased and disposed of just like other assets, goods or properties. 
However, unlike many other markets, the nascent market for patent rights is composed 
solely of private, bilateral dealings. In many respects, the market as it exists today 
operates in a rogue environment. There is little or no transparency of market information 
or means of identifying market behavior. The only mechanism for regulating this 
emerging market is through the courts, where predictability is difficult and barriers to 
entry – high legal costs – create the conditions for certain parties to exploit such 
uncertainty.”). 
 14 See, e.g., David Kravets, History Will Remember Obama as the Great Slayer of 
Patent Trolls, WIRED (Mar. 20, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/03/obama-
legacy-patent-trolls (“Often taking advantage of vague patent claims and a legal system 
slanted in the plaintiff’s favor, the company uses the patents to sue or threaten to sue 
other companies, with an eye to settling out of court for a fraction of what they were 
originally seeking.”). 
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development, and maturation.15 This Article will discuss this 
course and the basic steps involved in the evolution of an asset 
class. In particular, it will argue that the role of NPEs and 
“patent trolls” has been an essential evolutionary step in the 
progression of patent rights as an asset class and an article of 
trade. For the first time, speculators are participating in the 
patent market with only a monetary return as their objective. 
Without regard for the ethics or merits of particular activities or 
their impact on innovation, this circumstance has served as an 
exercise in educating the IP world about speculation, liquidity, 
valuation, and efficient asset management. In the absence of a 
central marketplace, third-party entities and syndicates such as 
RPX Corp., Allied Security Trust, LOT Network, and Intellectual 
Ventures act as agents on behalf of market participants to 
provide access, anonymity, and collective network effects in the 
market.16 This Article will point out that, in accordance with 
indicia related to the growth of other asset classes, these market 
participants should next look to build interoperability protocols 
(“best practices”), course of dealing standards, and mechanisms 
to provide greater transparency, all of which may be exercisable 
through a central marketplace. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I will explore the 
historical development of other asset classes in order to see what 
their evolutionary patterns can actually tell us about the 
roadmap for intellectual property as the next asset class. 
Specifically, the evolution of commodities and equities are 
studied. This will demonstrate that, notwithstanding the current 
“patent market for lemons” (its exploitation by non-practicing 
entity speculators and its perceived impact on innovation and the 
economy), there is a different vantage point from which it is clear 
that this phenomenon is a necessary step in the development of a 
new tradable asset class—intellectual property.17 Indeed, authors 
Mark Blaxill and Ralph Eckardt suggest that the development of 
nearly every asset class includes the evolutionary steps of: (1) a 
low volume of private transactions executed without 
transparency and involving assets not easily valued; 
(2) increased recognition of asset value and increased transaction 
activity due to third-party service providers, intermediaries, and 
 
 15 MARK BLAXILL & RALPH ECKARDT, THE INVISIBLE EDGE: TAKING YOUR STRATEGY 
TO THE NEXT LEVEL USING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 272–74 (2009). 
 16 RPX, http://www.rpxcorp.com (last visited May 18, 2015); ALLIED SECURITY 
TRUST, http://www.alliedsecuritytrust.com (last visited May 18, 2015); LOTNET, 
http://www.lotnet.com/lotnet-solution/index.cfm (last visited May 18, 2015); INTELLECTUAL 
VENTURES, http://www.intellectualventures.com (last visited May 18, 2015). 
 17 See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and 
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
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specialists; (3) an influx of speculators to develop liquidity; 
(4) development of a marketplace for exchange to create 
transparency, pricing mechanisms, and greater transaction 
efficiencies; and (5) development of derivatives and other 
instruments for hedging risk and investment.18  
Part II will take this pattern and hold it up to the evolution 
of the patent transactions market. It will explain that an 
understanding of the current patent market, and specifically 
market behavior which has caused an explosion of patent filings 
and litigation, requires first an understanding of phenomena 
shaping the market which are based in law and 
economics: (1) corporate value has inversed from traditionally 
tangible assets to newly recognized and managed intangible 
assets; (2) due to patent system challenges exacerbated by 
increased filings and limited patent office resources, patent 
rights are inherently probabilistic rights with increased 
uncertainties; (3) the patent market is primarily a private 
bilateral market with rogue actors and without information 
transparency or reliable quality and price benchmarks; and (4) as 
a result of (1)–(3), the patent market has become a “market for 
lemons,”19 where asymmetries of information and a favorable 
litigation environment are being exploited to extort value from 
low-quality assets, constraining the overall size of the market as 
a result. Due to the rise in patent value and risk, and the 
challenges of information discovery, new third-party specialists 
and intermediaries have entered the market to help fill the 
information gap. Finally, speculators have now emerged, 
utilizing the new information tools and resources available to 
profit from the trade of patent rights.  
Part III will benchmark intellectual property along the 
evolutionary path to asset class status. Specifically, it will 
conclude that speculative activity in the current “patent market 
for lemons” represents that we are at step three out of five, or 
rather, that NPEs are speculators helping to raise the awareness 
of patent rights as an asset class and article of trade. As a result, 
this Article will identify critical next steps to complete this 
evolutionary process. Specifically, the next step is the 
development of marketplaces that (1) reduce the effectiveness of 
 
 18 BLAXILL & ECKARDT, supra note 15, at 268–80. Blaxill and Eckardt suggest that 
six stages define the evolution of an asset class. This author believes, however, that the 
fourth stage they identify—the decline of transaction costs—is simply a long-developing 
product of: (1) specialists entering the market; (2) speculators entering the market; and 
(3) marketplaces for exchange developing. This results in only five real evolutionary 
stages. 
 19 Akerlof, supra note 17. 
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rogue activities that produce an environment that may be 
exploited by such NPEs to other market participants’ 
disadvantage and (2) increase the transparency, pricing 
mechanisms, and volume of patent transactions with reduced 
transaction costs. Standards in patent quality and course of 
dealing are necessary, and once these marketplaces for exchange 
are effectively operating, the development of derivatives for 
patents will solidify it as the next asset class.  
I. EVOLUTION OF AN ASSET CLASS 
An “asset class” is commonly defined as “[a] group of 
securities that exhibit similar [financial] characteristics, behave 
similarly in the marketplace, and are subject to the same laws 
and regulations.”20 Some people identify different investment 
instruments or assets as “asset classes,” and there is not always 
agreement on the identification of the major asset classes.21 It 
seems that the most widely agreed upon asset classes today 
include equity, bonds, cash instruments or currency, real estate, 
and commodities.22 The most common variation in the 
identification of an asset class is the mislabeling of an asset class 
category, such as small-cap stocks or high-yield bonds, as an 
“asset class.”23  
This Article purports to show that each of the major asset 
classes has experienced a common evolution—a path with similar 
“stages”—on its way to becoming an asset class (that is, a group 
of securities having similar financial characteristics, behaving 
similarly in the marketplace, and becoming subject to the same 
laws and regulations). Blaxill and Eckardt developed this idea by 
suggesting that asset markets go through six sequential stages 
 
 20 Asset Class, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/assetclasses.asp 
(last visited May 18, 2015).  
 21 Emily Hall, Do You Own Enough Asset Classes?: How to Diversify Your Portfolio 
Among Stocks, Bonds, and Cash, MORNINGSTAR (Feb. 25, 2004, 6:00 AM), 
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/pfarticle.aspx?id=104364& (“Some people think 
that asset classes are stocks, bonds, commodities, real estate, etc. Many people also 
include cap size, foreign, domestic, etc. under the definition of asset class.”).  
 22 See Charles Rotblut, Asset Classes Defined, AM. ASS’N INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS (July 
2010), http://www.aaii.com/journal/article/asset-classes-defined; see also Asset Classes 
Explained, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/uk/individual/resources/investment-
guides/understanding-investments/asset-classes-explained (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) 
(identifying equities, bonds, and cash as the three major asset classes). But see BRINKER 
CAPITAL, HELPING YOU INVEST WITH CONFIDENCE (2014), available at http://clients0.brink 
ercapital.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/BRO_INVEST_SLTN.pdf (identifying domestic 
equity, international equity, fixed income, absolute return, real assets, and private equity 
as the major asset classes); Infrastructure as an Asset Class, UBS, https://www.ubs.com/ 
global/en/asset_management/infrastructure-and-private-equity/about_iaf.html (last modified 
Jan. 19, 2012) (identifying infrastructure as an asset class comparable to other major 
asset classes in investment performance). 
 23 Hall, supra note 21. 
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on their way to becoming exchange-tradable asset classes, with 
derivatives and other product innovation further driving the 
market’s growth. These stages occur as follows: (1) assets are 
closely held and thinly traded; (2) specialists emerge to facilitate 
transactions; (3) speculators enter the market; (4) transaction 
costs decline; (5) marketplaces for exchange are established; and 
(6) derivatives emerge.24 For the purpose of this Article, the 
fourth stage—the decline of transaction costs—will not be 
addressed, because this author views it as a long-developing 
product of stages (1), (2), and (3), rather than a separate 
evolutionary stage. Blaxill and Eckardt offered minimal support 
or historical accounting to demonstrate that each of these stages 
did, in fact, occur sequentially for every major asset class.25 In 
this light, this author has found very little academic pursuit on 
the topic of one sequential path being taken to asset class status. 
Without this support and verification, it would be impossible to 
draw a parallel to intellectual property or benchmark its current 
life cycle relative to asset class status.  
By researching the history of the development of each asset 
market, this Article verifies that the five stages identified did 
occur sequentially for at least two of the major asset classes—
equities and commodities.26 An accounting of these stages for 
each asset market follows. 
A.  Development of Equities as an Asset Class 
1. Closely-Held and Thinly-Traded Assets 
For most major asset classes, the stages of evolution took 
place centuries ago—this is true for equities. For the purposes of 
this Article, equity is defined as corporate stock or a security that 
signifies ownership in a corporation and represents a claim on 
part of the corporation’s assets and earnings.27  
The significance of corporate entities began during the 
Roman Empire. In the early sixth century, Roman law recognized 
various types of municipal-led, political or religious-focused 
 
 24 BLAXILL & ECKARDT, supra note 15, at 269–79. 
 25 Id. Blaxill and Eckardt note various examples of certain asset classes for each of 
the stages, but fall short of demonstrating that each asset class followed a common path 
from stage one to stage six. The latter is what this author seeks to show, which will allow 
a more accurate benchmarking of the evolution of intellectual property. 
 26 For the purposes of this Article, research was confined to these two asset classes 
and did not attempt to verify the stages for real estate, currency, or bonds.  
 27 See Investopedia Staff, Stock Basics: What Are Stocks?, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/university/stocks/stocks1.asp (last visited May 18, 2015).  
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corporations under the names universitas, corpus, or collegium.28 
The alleged oldest commercial corporation in the world, the Stora 
Kopparberg mining community in Falun, Sweden, obtained a 
charter from King Magnus Eriksson in 1347.29 However, Stora is 
credited with its first memorialized stock transfer in 1288, when 
shares worth 12.5% of the company were transferred to Bishop 
Peter of Västerås in exchange for an estate.30 Until the 1600s, 
however, there is scant evidence of public investment 
opportunities related to corporations. As Blaxill and Eckardt 
point out, “[c]ompany stock and debt was once held exclusively by 
owner-managers.”31 In Rome, there is some evidence that certain 
firms, called publicani, were granted government contracts and 
became successful permanent companies with numerous 
non-manager investors reaching corporate status, including 
limited liability for the investors.32 In general, until the 1600s, 
corporate ownership was held by managing-members of the 
companies, and there was little speculative investment 
opportunity for this closely held equity. 
2. Specialists and Intermediaries Emerge to Facilitate 
Transactions 
As investment in private opportunities became important to 
wealthy individuals in the eleventh and twelfth centuries,33 there 
was a gap to be filled in linking those individuals with money 
and those presenting investment opportunities. Beginning in the 
1200s, private brokers and moneylenders began to fill gaps that 
could not be filled by banks in facilitating investment in private 
opportunities, such as voyages. Brokers met private investors in 
London coffee shops to propose the development of voyages and 
other opportunities and explain the need for financing these 
 
 28 1 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN 
LEGAL TRADITION 215–16 (1983), available at http://aprender.ead.unb.br/pluginfile.php/ 
904/course/section/1077/%5BHarold_J._Berman%5D_Law_and_Revolution,_The_Formati
%28Bookos.org%29.pdf. 
 29 BARINE A. KIRIMI & DAVID MINJA, TRANSFORMATIONAL CORPORATE LEADERSHIP 
22 (2012). 
 30 Kim Gittleson, Can a Company Live Forever?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2012, 3:24 
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16611040; Joanne Mason, 700-Year-Old 
Swedish Timber Company Is Still Going Strong by Branching Out, L.A. TIMES (June 7, 
1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-06-07/business/fi-3731_1_swedish-match. 
 31 BLAXILL & ECKARDT, supra note 15, at 270. 
 32 H.H. SCULLARD, A HISTORY OF THE ROMAN WORLD: 753 TO 146 BC, at 319 (4th ed. 
1980); Ulrike Malmendier, Roman Shares, in THE ORIGINS OF VALUE: THE FINANCIAL 
INNOVATIONS THAT CREATED MODERN CAPITAL MARKETS 31, 32–33 (William N. 
Goetzmann & K. Geert Rouwenhorst eds., 2005). 
 33 PAOLO MALANIMA, PRE-MODERN EUROPEAN ECONOMY: ONE THOUSAND YEARS 
(10TH–19TH CENTURIES) 327–28 (Maarten Prak & Jan Luiten van Zanden eds., Brill, 
Global Economic History Ser. Vol. 5, 2009). 
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endeavors.34 These individuals and firms also acted as 
consultants and investment advisors, providing advisory services 
to private investors on one hand and capital-raising services to 
companies on the other.35 Without these brokers, investors would 
not have had awareness of investment opportunities or a sense of 
their worth.  
In the 1300s, the Venetians led a burgeoning brokerage 
industry by trading debt securities from other governments.36 
Brokers carrying slates with information on the various 
issuances of government and private debt for sale would attend 
marketplaces and public commons and meet with clients to 
transact.37 In Antwerp, Belgium, in the 1500s, brokers and 
moneylenders would meet at a public securities exchange to 
trade in business, government, and even individual debt 
issuances.38 While these investment and broker services did not 
typically trade in equities, it began a period of specialization in 
third-party investment and brokerage services that would 
effectively lead to the development of the next generation of 
public equities trading. These intermediaries facilitated greater 
awareness of investments and measurement of their quality.  
3. Speculators Enter the Market 
For years, in order to lessen the risk of voyage disaster due 
to weather or Barbary pirates, ship owners had sought investors 
who would put up money for voyages—outfitting a ship and crew 
in return for a percentage of the proceeds if a voyage was 
successful.39 These early limited liability companies often lasted 
for only a single voyage; they were dissolved, and a new company 
was created for the next voyage.40 Investors spread their risk by 
 
 34 Id.; JOHN BIDDULPH MARTIN, “THE GRASSHOPPER” IN LOMBARD STREET 181 
(London, Leadenhall Press, Ltd. 1892), available at https://archive.org/details/grasshopper 
inlo00martgoog; John D. Pelzer, The Coffee Houses of Augustan London, HIST. TODAY, 
Oct. 1982, at 40, 40–47, available at http://www.historytoday.com/john-d-pelzer/coffee-
houses-augustan-london. 
 35 Pelzer, supra note 34. 
 36 Bryan Taylor, Birds, Boats and Bonds in Venice: The First AAA Government Issue, 
GLOBAL FIN. DATA, https://www.globalfinancialdata.com/gfdblog/?p=1818 (last visited 
May 18, 2015). 
 37 Peter Spufford, The Provision of Stable Moneys by Florence and Venice, and North 
Italian Financial Innovations in the Renaissance Period, in EXPLAINING MONETARY AND 
FINANCIAL INNOVATION 227, 227–51 (Peter Bernholz & Roland Vaubel eds., Springer, 
Financial and Monetary Policy Studies Ser. Vol. 39, 2014). 
 38 Markus A. Denzel, Monetary and Financial Innovations in Flanders, Antwerp, 
London and Hamburg: Fifteenth to Eighteenth Century, in EXPLAINING MONETARY AND 
FINANCIAL INNOVATION, supra note 37, at 253, 258. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
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investing in several different ventures at the same time, thereby 
playing the odds against all of them ending in disaster.41 
In the 1600s, the Dutch, British, French, Danish, and 
Portuguese governments all gave charters to companies with 
East India in their names.42 England was first, chartering the 
East India Company on December 31, 1600.43 The British East 
India Company pioneered the first joint ownership of stock, but 
at first joint stocks were created for each voyage, limiting the 
ability to mitigate risk by spreading investment across all 
voyages.44 By 1657, the company was formalized as a “continuous 
unlimited investment taking place without reference to 
individual voyages.”45 The Dutch East India Company (the 
Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, or VOC) is credited with 
being the first publicly traded company by offering the first 
self-issuance of publicly negotiable stock, allowing investment 
risk to be spread across all of its ships’ voyages in a regulated 
market environment.46 The success of the East India companies 
drove other publicly tradable companies to the market as well. 
Some of these had government charters, such as the English 
South Sea Company, and others were less official.47  
The result of new equity investment opportunities was the 
emergence of new speculation. Financial speculation had already 
been active in Antwerp and Lyons involving government debts 
and other securities, but after Lyons’ markets died when King 
Henry II of France suspended payments on his debts in 1557 and 
Antwerp was sacked by Spanish troops in 1585, speculation 
activity shifted to London and Amsterdam following the 
emergence of tradable equities in the East India Companies.48 
Soon, capital from investors all over Europe was being invested 
in East India equities, among other financial assets, in 
 
 41 Id. at 254, 276.  
 42 East India Company, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_India_Company 
(last visited May 18, 2015). 
 43 Rob Wile, Bailouts, Bribes and Insider Trading: Here’s What the World’s Leading 
Business Looked Like 300 Years Ago, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 21, 2012, 12:26 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/history-of-british-east-india-company-2013-4.  
 44 Id. 
 45 Id.  
 46 Clem Chambers, Who Needs Stock Exchanges?, MONDOVISIONE (July 14, 2006), 
http://www.mondovisione.com/exchanges/handbook-articles/who-needs-stock-exchanges/; 
see also EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL 
SPECULATION 9 (2000) (“Although the Dutch did not invent the institutions and practices 
of financial capitalism such as banking, double-entry bookkeeping, joint-stock companies, 
bills of exchange, and stock markets, they brought together and established them on a 
secure basis in a mercantile economy organised around a highly evolved profit motive.”). 
 47 RICHARD DALE, THE FIRST CRASH: LESSONS FROM THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE 40 
(2004). 
 48 CHANCELLOR, supra note 46, at 8–9.  
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Amsterdam and London.49 Speculation in these markets hit an 
all-time high in the early 1700s during the “South Sea Bubble,” 
prior to the creation of a regulated stock exchange in London.50 
During this period, investors poured into coffee shops to throw 
money at things as wild as “a company for carrying out an 
undertaking of great advantage, but nobody to know what it is.”51  
Speculative zeal had risen steadily in the English breast during the 
preceding 30 years, the childhood of the London Stock Exchange. A 
gargantuan Mississippi Bubble had expanded in France. Cupidity was 
not unknown in Holland. From September 1719 through August 1720, 
190 English speculative ventures had their initial public offerings. 
Some were honest, many not.52 
4. Marketplaces for Exchange Are Developed 
The new speculative activity around equities led to the 
development of the first stock exchange in 1602, commencing 
with the issuance of stock in the Dutch East India Company.53 
Finding real secondary market volume and liquidity by the 
1630s, the Amsterdam exchange was home to the first 
market-making activity through the buying and selling of VOC 
shares on demand.54 The real evolution of stock exchanges, 
however, followed in 1698 when London stock broker John 
Castaing began to post a list of stock and commodity prices called 
“The Course of the Exchange and other things” at Jonathon’s 
Coffee House after stock brokers were banned from the Royal 
Exchange for their manners.55 According to the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) today, this was “the earliest evidence of 
organised trading in marketable securities in London.”56 In 1773, 
a group of 150 brokers erected “The Stock Exchange” at 
Jonathon’s, in 1801 it took on a membership subscription 
structure, and in 1812 the first codified rule book was formed.57 
Nineteen years after the creation of “The Stock Exchange” in 
 
 49 Id. at 9–10. 
 50 Our History, LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/ 
about-the-exchange/company-overview/our-history/our-history.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 
2015) [hereinafter LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE].  
 51 The Financial System: What Went Wrong, ECONOMIST (Mar. 19, 2008), 
http://www.economist.com/node/10881318.  
 52 Christopher Reed, “The Damn’d South Sea,” HARV. MAG., May–June 1999, at 36, 
40, available at https://harvardmagazine.com/1999/05/damnd.html. 
 53 Dutch Fleet: The Home of the World’s First Stock Exchange Is Now a 
High-Frequency Heartland, ECONOMIST (Apr. 20, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/ 
finance-and-economics/21576423-home-worlds-first-stock-exchange-now-high-frequency-
heartland-dutch.  
 54 Id.  
 55 LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 50. 
 56 Id.  
 57 Id.  
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London, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), formed by 
brokers under a buttonwood tree, made its home on Wall 
Street.58 The NYSE would enjoy little competition in the United 
States until the birth of the NASDAQ in 1971.59 Although 
London emerged as the major European exchange, many 
companies that were capable of listing internationally still listed 
on the NYSE.60 “Many other countries including Germany, 
France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, South Africa, Hong Kong, 
Japan, Australia and Canada developed their own stock 
exchanges, but these were largely seen as proving grounds for 
domestic companies to inhabit until they were ready to make the 
leap to the LSE and from there to the big leagues of the NYSE.”61 
These exchanges provided regulation, access, liquidity, and price 
discovery mechanisms not readily available prior to the early 
seventeenth century.  
5. Development of Derivatives 
Some academics have suggested that derivatives were not 
developed until the twenty-first century, or even in the last 
twenty-five years.62 Early evidence of equities derivatives is 
sparse, which is likely a result of their over-the-counter nature 
and association with privately dealt margin loans and short sale 
transactions.63 Nevertheless, some historians have found enough 
evidence to tag their development to the early seventeenth 
century. The development of the Amsterdam exchange brought 
on the first derivative products for both commodities and 
equities. An accounting by Edward Chancellor of these events 
provides an excellent summary: 
In the early seventeenth century, [derivatives] became available in 
the actions (shares) of the East India Company. Speculators could also 
take out loans on shares at up to four-fifths of their market value 
 
 58 Ellen Terrell, History of the New York Stock Exchange, LIBR. CONGRESS, 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/business/hottopic/stock_market.html (last updated Oct. 2012).  
 59 Ellen Terrell, History of the American and NASDAQ Stock Exchanges, LIBR. 
CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/rr/business/amex/amex.html (last updated Oct. 2012).  
 60 Andrew Beattie, The Birth of Stock Exchanges, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.invest 
opedia.com/articles/07/stock-exchange-history.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).  
 61 Id. 
 62 Ernst Juerg Weber, A Short History of Derivative Security Markets 1 (Univ. of W. 
Austl., Economic Discussion Paper No. 08.10, 2008), available at http://www.uwa.edu.au/ 
__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/94260/08_10_Weber.pdf; see also JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, 
FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 1 (7th ed. 2008) (“In the last 30 years derivatives have 
become increasingly important in finance. Futures and options are now traded actively on 
many exchanges throughout the world.”). 
 63 Weber, supra note 62, at 2 (“The history of derivatives has remained unexplored 
because there are few historical records of derivative dealings. Derivatives left no paper 
trail because they are private agreements that have been traded in over-the-counter 
markets for most of their history.”). 
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(what Americans later called “margin loans”). Stock options—which 
gave the buyer the right, but unlike the futures contract not the 
obligation, to buy or sell shares at a fixed price during the contract 
period—were also traded on the Exchange. Later in the century, 
ducaton shares in the East India Company were introduced; valued at 
a tenth of the highly priced ordinary shares, they enabled less wealthy 
speculators to play the market. Futures, options, and ducaton shares 
are all examples of what we call derivatives, namely financial 
contracts which derive their value from an underlying asset, such as a 
share. Together with stock loans, they created the opportunity for 
financial leverage, so that small rises in share prices brought larger 
percentage gains to speculators (with small price declines producing 
the opposite effect).64 
Similarly, Ernst Weber provides another account linking 
early seventeenth century Amsterdam to the first stable bourse 
for derivatives trading: 
Right from the beginning [of the issuance of East India Company 
shares], share trading involved contracts for differences. In an essay 
on the speculative activities of Isaac Le Maire (1558–1624), van Dillen 
noted that shares were traded “on term” (for future 
delivery): “[S]hares sold not only for cash but also on term. This wasn’t 
anything new in Amsterdam, since term sales had been the custom for 
trade in wheat and herring.” He also found that forward contracts on 
shares were usually settled as contracts for differences: “Instead of 
delivering the shares, people were content most often to pay the 
surplus, the difference between trading rates, which had to be settled 
later.” Amsterdam was the first city where derivatives that were 
based on securities were used freely for a long period of time.65 
Therefore, it is clear that the emergence of more regulated 
trading and a central marketplace for price discovery and other 
market facilities gave birth to a steady environment for new 
speculative activity in the form of derivative contracts for 
equities. 
B.  Development of Commodities as an Asset Class 
1. Closely-Held and Thinly-Traded Assets 
Similar to equities, the evolution of commodities as an article 
of trade occurred over centuries, but the time from specialists 
emerging to the development of derivatives was less than one 
hundred years. Indeed, the exchange of commodities may have 
 
 64 CHANCELLOR, supra note 46, at 10. 
 65 Weber, supra note 62, at 13 (citations omitted) (quoting J.G. van Dillen, Geoffrey 
Poitras & Asha Majithia, Isaac Le Maire and the Early Trading in Dutch East India 
Company Shares, in 1 PIONEERS OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 45, 53–58 (Geoffrey Poitras 
ed., 2006), available at http://www.sfu.ca/~poitras/ch2_lemaire.pdf). 
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begun over 150,000 years ago.66 For the purposes of this Article, a 
commodity is defined as a raw material or primary agricultural 
product that can be bought and sold, from hard commodities like 
metals and oil to soft commodities like agriculture and 
livestock.67  
Obsidian and lapis lazuli are two minerals that have the 
longest trade history. Obsidian originated in the southwest of 
Asia68 and traded in early markets in Guinea from 17,000 BC 
onward. Lapis lazuli originated in the Sar-i Sang mines of 
Afghanistan69 and traded in the markets of Babylonia during the 
Kassite period, circa 1595 BC.70 Long-range trade routes first 
appeared in the third millennium BC between the Harappan 
civilization and the Sumerians.71 The Phoenicians were also 
noted sea traders, traversing the Mediterranean and creating 
enclaves for trading centers in various ports as they went,72 
known to the Greeks as emporia.73  
Financially lucrative trade brought valuable commodities 
from across regions. While the concept of free trade was still 
inapposite to some cultures during this period, stable and secure 
transportation networks to enable the transfer of goods without 
fear of piracy remained of paramount importance until the fall of 
the Roman Empire in the fifth century.74 While the fall of the 
Roman Empire and the succeeding Dark Ages brought instability 
to trade networks in the Western World, markets in Africa, the 
Middle East, India, China, and Southeast Asia continued to 
flourish.75 Continuing through to the Middle Ages, Central Asia 
became the economic center of the world, with the Silk Road 
 
 66 See PETER WATSON, IDEAS: A HISTORY OF THOUGHT AND INVENTION, FROM FIRE TO 
FREUD 71 (2005). 
 67 See Commodity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 331 (10th ed. 2014); see also Joshua 
Kennon, What Are Commodities, ABOUT MONEY, http://beginnersinvest.about.com/cs/ 
commodities/f/whatcommodities.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). 
 68 RICHARD L. SMITH, PREMODERN TRADE IN WORLD HISTORY 19–20 (2009). 
 69 TOBY A. H. WILKINSON, EARLY DYNASTIC EGYPT 164 (2001); DOMINIQUE COLLON, 
INTERPRETING THE PAST: NEAR EASTERN SEALS 32 (1990). 
 70 GWENDOLYN LEICK, THE BABYLONIAN WORLD 520 (2007).  
 71 See 3 MARSHALL CAVENDISH CORP., WORLD AND ITS PEOPLES: MIDDLE EAST, 
WESTERN ASIA, AND NORTHERN AFRICA 312 (2007).  
 72  See CITIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: A HISTORICAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 104–05 (Michael R.T. Dumper & Bruce E. Stanley eds., 2007). 
 73 JOHANNES HASEBROEK, TRADE AND POLITICS IN ANCIENT GREECE 107 (L.M. Fraser 
& D.C. Macgregor trans., 1933). 
 74 See generally id. at 46–55. 
 75 See Golden Age of West Africa, STUDENTS’ HISTORY, http://dgh.wikispaces.com/ 
Golden+Age+of+West+Africa? (last updated May 16, 2014); A.G. HOPKINS, AN ECONOMIC 
HISTORY OF WEST AFRICA 80 (1973) (“The period which corresponds to the Middle Ages in 
European history was a flourishing time for trade on the Saharan routes . . . .”). 
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acting as the main trade route from the fifth to eighth century.76 
From the eighth to eleventh century, Vikings traded as they 
sailed to Western Europe and Varangians traded as they sailed 
from Scandinavia to Russia.77  
During these periods, the trade of commodities was largely 
based on real need for other goods and for the actual transport 
and supply of those goods to ports and city marketplaces. There 
was little investment opportunity, and supply was not always 
predictable. To build predictability in supply, the thirteenth 
century brought with it the first alliances of trading cities. For 
example, the Hanseatic League maintained a trade monopoly 
over most of Northern Europe and the Baltics from the 
thirteenth to seventeenth century.78 In the sixteenth century, the 
“Seventeen Provinces” of the Dutch Republic became the centers 
of free trade, imposing no exchange controls and advocating for 
the free movement of goods.79 Despite these new “efficiencies,” 
trading remained sporadic and was primarily farmer-to-farmer 
or farmer-to-merchant, which caused access, delivery, and 
predictability problems. 
2. Specialists and Intermediaries Emerge to Facilitate 
Transactions 
Merchants who acted as early intermediaries in commodities 
markets frequently looked for ways to improve the relay of 
information on crop availability.80 Merchants could act on behalf 
of farmers and provide value with their knowledge of buyers who 
regularly came to the market in previous seasons. However, it 
wasn’t until the nineteenth century that commodities markets 
saw an influx of specialists and intermediaries to help facilitate 
transactions. Two major inventions of the nineteenth century, 
the telegraph and the steamship, “changed the price formation 
process [for commodities] by taking into account, for the first 
 
 76 HOPKINS, supra note 75; see Silk Road, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Silk_Road (last visited May 18, 2015); Sogdian Trade, ENCYCLOPÆDIA IRANICA, 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/sogdian-trade (last visited May 18, 2015).  
 77 See 1 CANDICE GOUCHER & LINDA WALTON, WORLD HISTORY: JOURNEYS FROM 
PAST TO PRESENT 290–91 (2d ed. 2013).  
 78 Id. at 174, 557. 
 79 See Bruce Bartlett, The Truth About Trade in History, in FREEDOM TO 
TRADE: REFUTING THE NEW PROTECTIONISM 9, 10–11 (Edward L. Hudgins ed., 1997). 
 80 See, e.g., Roads and Relay Hostels, JOURNEY TO CHINA, https://sites.google.com/ 
a/fullerton.edu/journey-to-china/lesson-plans/chinese-innovations/roads-and-relay-hostels 
(last visited May 18, 2015) (discussing the roads and relay hostels of the Tang & Song 
dynasties circa 700 AD); MONICA L. WRIGHT, WEAVING NARRATIVE: CLOTHING IN 
TWELFTH-CENTURY FRENCH ROMANCE 29–33 (2010) (examining how increased trade led 
to twelfth-century merchant class improvements in relaying information).  
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time, non-local demand and supply conditions.”81 Summarized 
below, the number of information specialists, brokers, delivery 
agents, and other intermediaries grew significantly soon 
thereafter to create market efficiencies and build transaction 
volume.  
Telegraph. The first working transatlantic cable was 
installed in 1864, connecting Manchester and New York.82 This 
cable reduced communication time considerably, allowing a 
message and a response to be sent in the same day.83 “[T]his and 
subsequent cables were financed by the British textile industry 
which was the first industry to realize the benefits of 
instantaneous communication (they were interested in the 
supply conditions of cotton in the US).”84 In 1873, 1874, and 1894, 
British-, French-, German-, and American-owned cables were 
laid linking Europe and North America in a web of faster 
communication.85  
Steamship. Before the transatlantic cable, communications 
between Europe and North and South America took place only by 
ship, which severe winters could delay for weeks. The expanded 
use of steamships in the 1840s allowed information to cross the 
Atlantic in two weeks rather than two months.86 Not only did 
information on cotton conditions get to British manufacturers 
much sooner, cotton and other product samples traveled quicker 
as well.  
These intermediary instruments, and the delivery agents 
that facilitated them, helped build a burgeoning market for 
commodities trading and, of course, speculation. 
3. Speculators Enter the Market 
“Historically, gold and silver [were] the only commodities 
[that had] been used as hedging instruments by agents who [had] 
nothing to do with the ‘precious metals industry.’”87 An example 
is grain markets in North America. “Speculators in grain first 
appeared at Chicago in the 1840s,” once steamships began 
 
 81 JOHN BAFFES, COMMODITY FUTURES EXCHANGES: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND 
NEW REALITIES 5 (2011), available at http://www.agriskmanagementforum.org/sites/ag 
riskmanagementforum.org/files/Baffes%20Futures%20Trading%20Zurich%20%20June%2
09%2010%202011.pdf. 
 82 Id. at 6. 
 83 See A.J. WILSON, THE LIVING ROCK: THE STORY OF METALS SINCE EARLIEST TIMES 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON DEVELOPING CIVILIZATION 203 (1994). 
 84 BAFFES, supra note 81, at 6. 
 85 Transatlantic Telegraph Cable, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans 
atlantic_telegraph_cable (last visited May 18, 2015). 
 86 BAFFES, supra note 81, at 5. 
 87 Id. at 12.  
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transporting information and articles of trade faster.88 Under 
economists John Keynes and John Hicks’ theory of normal 
backwardation, “a producer of grain would sell grain futures to 
lock in the future price of his crops and obtain insurance against 
the price risk of grain at harvest time.”89 “Speculators would 
provide this insurance and buy futures, but demand a futures 
price which [was] below the spot price that could be expected to 
prevail at the maturity of the futures contract,”90 receiving 
“a risk premium from producers for assuming the risk of future 
price fluctuations.”91 With development of grain warehousing, 
speculation shifted to warehouse receipts, and from there, the 
development of futures exchanges provided a more convenient 
and economic means of speculation.  
4. Marketplaces for Exchange Are Developed 
Equipped with new means to obtain commodities supply 
information quickly, and new futures contracts on which to 
speculate, merchants, producers, and brokers needed central 
marketplaces for trading commodities futures contracts. By the 
end of the 1880s, in the agricultural revolution following the 
American Civil War,92 five cotton futures exchanges were 
connected by cable: Buffalo, New York City, Manchester, Havre, 
and Alexandria. Soon, futures exchanges became global 
institutions for trading many commodities, including flour, corn, 
wheat, and eggs.93 These exchanges grew out of the need for 
marketing functions that the existing markets were not 
providing. As a result, the production of, and trade for, certain 
commodities grew. For example, wheat production climbed from 
170 million bushels farmed from 15 million acres in 1866, to 502 
million bushels farmed from 38 million acres by 1880.94 Those 
ready to assume risks profited from seizing opportunities, and 
central marketplaces facilitated opportunities that did not exist 
 
 88 Harold D. Guither, Comment, Commodities Exchanges, Agrarian “Political 
Power,” and the Antioption Battle, 48 AGRIC. HIST. 126, 128 (1974). 
 89 Gary Gorton & K. Geert Rouwenhorst, Facts and Fantasies About Commodity 
Futures 3–4, 12 (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 06-07, 2005), available at 
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/06/0607.pdf. 
 90 Id. at 4. 
 91 Id. at 4, n.5 (citing 2 JOHN M. KEYNES, A TREATISE ON MONEY 144 (1930) (“In 
other words, the quoted forward price, though above the present spot price, must fall 
below the anticipated future spot price by at least the amount of normal 
backwardation.”)). 
 92 H.R. DOC. NO. 76-695, at 221–22 (1940). 
 93 BAFFES, supra note 81, at 5–6, 13. For example, the New York Cotton Exchange 
(NYCE), established in 1870, operated as an independent entity until 1998 when it 
merged with the Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE), founded in 1882. 
 94 HAROLD D. GUITHER, HERITAGE OF PLENTY: A GUIDE TO THE ECONOMIC HISTORY 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. AGRICULTURE 264 tbl.10 (2d ed. 1972). 
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without the transparency and pricing mechanisms provided by 
these platforms.95  
5. Development of Derivatives 
When the steamships allowed information and commodities 
to travel faster, “merchants in Liverpool [began] trading ‘to 
arrive’ or ‘in transit’ contracts, more than one month prior to the 
physical transaction.”96 This was the emergence of futures 
contracts in commodities. However, innovation in futures 
contracts did not explode until the twenty-first century, creating 
a new derivatives market for commodities that now provides new 
speculation and trading opportunities that did not exist in the 
nineteenth century.97 New derivatives include products such as 
commodity futures index funds.98 Economists Parantap Basu and 
William Gavin suggest that it may not have been until this 
evolutionary stage, which did not occur until the last ten to 
fifteen years, that commodities became a real tradable asset 
class: 
[There has been a] massive increase in trading in commodity 
derivatives over the past decade—growth that far outstrips the 
growth in commodity production and the need for derivatives to hedge 
risk by commercial producers and users of commodities. During the 
past decade, many institutional portfolio managers added commodity 
derivatives as an asset class to their portfolios.99 
II. THE MARKET FOR PATENT ASSETS 
A.  Closely-Held and Thinly-Traded Assets 
1. Increasing Value and Risk of Intellectual Property  
For two centuries, the patent transaction market was a 
private, clandestine market that preferred the exclusive nature 
of the rights over the collaborative nature of rights transfer. Over 
the past thirty-five years, corporate value, or what is 
traditionally perceived to drive corporate value, has changed 
from being comprised mostly of tangible assets to intangible 
assets.100 Among other causes, the inverse has resulted because 
 
 95 Guither, supra note 88, at 128–29. 
 96 BAFFES, supra note 81, at 5.  
 97 Parantap Basu & William T. Gavin, What Explains the Growth in Commodity 
Derivatives?, 93 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 37, 37–48 (2011), available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/11/01/37-48Basu.pdf. 
 98 Id. at 38. 
 99 Id. at 37. 
 100 Intangible Asset Market Value, supra note 2 (“Intangible book value is calculated 
by subtracting the tangible book value from the market capitalization of a given company 
or index. In practice, companies report tangible book value per share, number of shares 
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of an increased recognition of intangible assets for accounting 
purposes and because of the internet and information age driving 
a new knowledge economy where, for example, companies having 
few assets other than a website, customer list (or subscribers), 
and patents can have billion-dollar valuations.101 Moreover, the 
financial crisis in 2008 forced many companies to look to 
alternative assets to create value, and patents became a focus for 
revenue generation.102  
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has 
taken measures in the past decade to make sure companies are 
recognizing and distinguishing amortizable intangible assets 
such as intellectual property from goodwill. FASB Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 141, Business 
Combinations,103 and Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets,104 
require that companies can no longer combine goodwill with 
intellectual property on their balance sheets. Instead they must 
report these intangibles separately and categorize the asset 
classes by type of intellectual property, providing the estimated 
useful lives of such intangible assets in financial statements. The 
result did not increase the value of intellectual property, but 
instead raised awareness of accounting and valuation of 
intellectual property previously ignored for these purposes. This 
process has opened eyes over the past twenty years to the value 
 
outstanding, and market capitalization. Therefore, intangible book value can be 
calculated by subtracting the market capitalization from the tangible book value per 
share multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. It is expedient to do the 
calculation on a per share basis, as we have done here, and simply subtract the tangible 
book value per share from the market price. There are modest discrepancies between the 
two numbers due to differences in setting shares outstanding on a company by company 
basis. However, the discrepancy is rarely a few percentage points which are within the 
error needed for most purposes.”). 
 101 RICARDO BLAUG & ROHIT LEKHI, WORK FOUND., ACCOUNTING FOR 
INTANGIBLES: FINANCIAL REPORTING AND VALUE CREATION IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 
11–21 (2009), available at http://www.theworkfoundation.com/assets/docs/publications/ 
223_intangibles _final.pdf. 
 102 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS 
8–10 (2010), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/941/wipo_pub 
_941_2010.pdf. 
 103 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FIN. ACCOUNTING FOUND., PUB. NO. 299-A, 
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 141 (revised 2007): BUSINESS 
COMBINATIONS, at ii (2007), available at http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/ 
DocumentPage?cid=1218220124931&acceptedDisclaimer=true.  
 104 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FIN. ACCOUNTING FOUND., STATEMENT OF 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 142: GOODWILL AND OTHER INTANGIBLE ASSETS 5 
(2001), available at http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1218 
220124961&acceptedDisclaimer=true.  
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that patent assets protect, helping to attribute part or all of this 
value to the patents themselves in some cases.105  
In addition, the 1990s introduced a new knowledge 
economy106 and an Internet age that has contributed to 
multi-billion-dollar valuations for companies that are not the 
manufacturing companies or industrial juggernauts that once 
dominated the S&P 500.107 For these and other companies where 
competition depends heavily on information and protection of 
knowledge and business processes to gain competitive advantage, 
IP strategy has become paramount.108 More recently, the 
financial crisis in 2008 caused companies to turn to their patents 
to generate new income, evidenced by the numerous creative 
patent transactions and privateering deals structured by 
companies since 2008.109 Deals that transfer patents to 
independent third parties in return for participation in licensing 
and litigation proceeds continue to remain popular through 2014, 
transforming patents into a lucrative article of trade.110 For 
example, in January 2012, wireless firm Adaptix sold more than 
 
 105 The Nortel Networks bankruptcy and windup of its assets demonstrated that the 
company’s patents were worth more than all of its other assets. The company’s assets 
were sold for approximately $3 billion, while the patent portfolio was sold for $4.5 billion. 
See Nortel: Wind-Up, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nortel#Wind-up (last visited 
May 18, 2015). 
 106 See generally IAN BRINKLEY, WORK FOUND., DEFINING THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 
(2006), available at http://www.theworkfoundation.com/downloadpublication/report/ 
65_65_defining%20knowledge%20economy.pdf. 
 107 See, e.g., Scott DeCarlo, The World’s 25 Most Valuable Companies: Apple Is Now 
on Top, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2011, 10:27 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottdecarlo/ 
2011/08/11/the-worlds-25-most-valuable-companies-apple-is-now-on-top/; Evelyn M. Rusli 
& Douglas MacMillan, Uber Gets an Uber-Valuation: Car Service Secures $1.2 Billion in 
Funding, Valuing It at $18.2 Billion, Among Highest Ever, WALL ST. J. (June 6, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-gets-uber-valuation-of-18-2-billion-1402073876; Wayne 
Busch & Juan Pedro Moreno, Banks’ New Competitors: Starbucks, Google, and Alibaba, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 20, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/02/banks-new-competitors-starbucks-
google-and-alibaba. 
 108 Allen W. Wang, Rise of the Patent Intermediaries, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 159, 
162–65 (2010) (citing Ashby H.B. Monk, The Emerging Market for Intellectual Property: 
Drivers, Restrainers, and Implications, 9 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 469, 482 (2009) (stating 
that business managers now view patents as “an important asset class that can be 
monetized to generate income”)). 
 109 See Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by 
Corporations and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 10 (2012) (“[O]perating 
companies have increasingly explored indirect uses of IPRs, from buying patents and then 
asserting them against competitors to buying patents solely for the purpose of filing a 
countersuit in an infringement litigation initiated by a competitor.”); see also Ashby 
Jones, The Amazing Adventures of Mr. Desmarais and Mr. Powers, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 
2012, 10:35 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/01/23/THE-amazing-adventures-of-mr-
desmarais-and-mr-powers/. 
 110 Ewing, supra note 109, at 3; Jones, supra note 109. 
Do Not Delete 6/6/2015 12:16 PM 
2015] From a Market for Lemons to a Marketplace for Patents 779 
200 patents to patent licensing firm Acacia.111 In July 2012, 
Fujifilm sold 1200 patents to patent licensing and technology 
firm Universal Display.112 On December 16, 2013, Panasonic sold 
900 patents to patent licensing firm Wi-Lan, and on January 6, 
2014, it sold 500 additional patents to patent licensing firm 
Inventergy.113 Nokia has sold its patents to various licensing 
agent firms more than twenty times since 2008.114 These 
represent just a fraction of similar deals consummated in the 
past five years. Moreover, AT&T, among other companies, has 
developed website pages dedicated to offering certain of its 
patents for sale.115 Most of these types of transactions remain 
confidential and without price discovery. 
A well-publicized example of both the increased recognition 
of intellectual property and the increased dependency on patents 
to compete is the recent sale of bankrupt Nortel Networks 
Corporation’s patent portfolio. After most of Nortel’s other assets 
were sold to various companies for an approximate aggregate 
value of $3 billion, Nortel’s patent portfolio, presumably 
protecting these assets and businesses, was sold through auction 
for $4.5 billion.116 This auction demonstrates both the old guard 
and the new guard. Representing the old guard through Nortel’s 
role, the event highlights what companies have traditionally 
neglected to recognize—namely, the value of patent assets 
attributable to shareholder value. Representing the new guard, it 
demonstrates through the role of the winning bidders the 
increased emphasis on the value of patent assets—namely, the 
significance of high-stakes patent weaponry to competition. 
Specifically, the winning bid came from a consortium of 
companies, all aligned by the same competitive interest—to keep 
the patents out of the hands of Google.117 Therefore, the patents 
 
 111 See Ben Dummett, Acacia to Acquire Adaptix for $160 Million, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 
12, 2012, 11:57 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020440900457715747 
0455118362. 
 112 See Press Release, Fujifilm, Fujifilm Corporation Sells Its Worldwide OLED 
Patent Portfolio to Universal Display Corporation for US$105 Million (July 24, 2012), 
available at http://www.fujifilm.com/news/n120724.html. 
 113 Joff Wild, Panasonic Makes a Major Privateering Play as Japanese Companies 
Seek to Sweat Their Patents, IAM BLOG (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.iam-magazine.com/ 
Blog/Detail.aspx?g=9375cbd5-7354-41fe-bd18-32a5d392bfde.  
 114 Susan Decker, Patent Privateers Sail the Legal Waters Against Apple, Google, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 10, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-01-11/ 
patent-privateers-sail-the-legal-waters-against-apple-google (noting Nokia has transferred 
its patents to privateers for licensing income more than twenty times since 2008). 
 115 See Patent Sales, AT&T, http://www.att.com/gen/sites/ipsales?pid=17701 (last visited 
May 18, 2015). 
 116 See Nortel: Wind-Up, supra note 105.  
 117 Joff Wild, Google Bid $4 Billion for the Nortel Patents and Still Lost – Updated, 
IAM BLOG (July 2, 2011), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=1d7387a7-70 
fc-4e12-807b-e568c19f63e1.  
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had significant defensive value. Some of the patents have since 
been asserted, highlighting their offensive value as well.118 
2. Patents Are Probabilistic Rights 
A patent is an exclusive or negative property right,119 but it 
is not an absolute right. Once granted, the right may be 
subsequently eliminated or limited without recourse or 
compensation. Simply put, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO), like a football referee, makes 
mistakes, and instant replay is always available to wave off the 
initial grant of a touchdown and six points. In addition, the 
strength or value of the “right” depends on a number of factors, 
both intrinsic and acquired.120 The value of a patent right 
depends on its enforceability, and enforceability depends on, 
among other things, the patent’s owner,121 validity, and claim 
coverage. Both validity and claim coverage are largely dependent 
upon subjective interpretation of, for example, the relevance of 
prior art references and the construction of claim language, 
respectively. The arbiter of interpretation is typically the USPTO 
or a federal court, and proceedings before either are popularly 
characterized as uncertain and unpredictable.122  
As a result, every decision to act on account of, or in 
ignorance of, relevant third-party patents, including the act of 
blatant copying or intentional use of a patent, holds a probability 
of liability greater than zero and less than one hundred. This 
circumstance exists because the issuance of a patent from the 
USPTO only includes a rebuttable presumption that the patent is 
valid.123 Keith Leffler and Cristofer Leffler have described the 
circumstantial probability of patent rights: 
[T]he right that Congress gave to patent holders as a reward for their 
invention was the right to seek redress in the federal courts. Congress 
expressly designated the federal courts as the body with institutional 
authority to determine patent validity and infringement. Moreover, 
 
 118 Joe Mullin, Patent War Goes Nuclear: Microsoft, Apple-Owned “Rockstar” Sues 
Google, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 31, 2013, 8:10 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/ 
10/patent-war-goes-nuclear-microsoft-apple-owned-rockstar-sues-google/. 
 119 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (“Every patent shall contain a short title of the 
invention and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others 
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention . . . and, if the invention is a 
process, of the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling . . . products 
made by that process, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof.”). 
 120 Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 297–300 
(2011) (noting that in addition to intrinsic characteristics, certain acquired characteristics 
of a patent, such as transferability, may also be used to predict the value of a patent).  
 121 Id. at 325.  
 122 Id. at 285. 
 123 35 U.S.C. § 282.  
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Congress did not provide, as it might have, that a patent once issued 
by the [PTO] is conclusively presumed to be valid. Rather, it provided 
that patents shall enjoy only a rebuttable presumption of 
validity. . . . [Therefore] patent rights are probabilistic—the only 
validity is that decided by the courts. That this set of rights is 
probabilistic does not mean that the patent “does not really exist until 
you go to court” or that the patent is “unborn.” Rather, in any patent 
dispute, until determined by a federal court, there is a probability that 
a patent will be found to be invalid.124 
Mark Lemley, among many other authors, has contributed 
significant thought to the probabilistic nature of patent rights.125 
Wrote Lemley:  
Given [the] uncertainties, economists have increasingly recognized 
that a patent does not confer upon its owner the right to exclude but 
rather a right to try to exclude by asserting the patent in court. When 
a patent holder asserts its patent against an alleged infringer, the 
patent holder is rolling the dice. If the patent is found invalid, the 
property right will have evaporated.126 
The fact that the property right can be eliminated or 
modified subsequent to being granted is not the only factor 
making patent rights probabilistic. The right to exclude may only 
be enforced through court, and patent litigation is itself very 
unpredictable as a result of varying procedure by jurisdiction, the 
length and cost of proceedings, inconsistent precedent and jury 
instructions, and subjective interpretation of the construction of 
language.127 Leffler and Leffler proclaimed “the ‘rights’ of a 
 
 124 Keith Leffler & Cristofer Leffler, The Probabilistic Nature of Patent Rights: In 
Response to Kevin McDonald, ANTITRUST MAG., Summer 2003, at 77, 78 (citations 
omitted), available at http://staff.washington.edu/kleffler/Probabilistic%20Patent%20 
Rights%204-21-03.doc; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012) (“The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to 
patents . . . .”); 35 U.S.C. § 282. 
 125 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, J. ECON. PERSP., 
Spring 2005, at 75, available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/patents.pdf. 
 126 Id. (citations omitted).  
 127 See Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent 
Litigation: The Time Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 175 (2001) (“[T]he field of patent infringement litigation currently 
lacks the certainty and predictability necessary to efficiently litigate (and resolve) 
cases.”); see also Paul M. Janicke, On the Causes of Unpredictability of Federal Circuit 
Decisions in Patent Cases, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 93, 93–94 (2005) (noting other 
scholars’ criticisms of “inconsistency” and “unpredictability” in Federal Circuit patent law 
decisions); Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Donald R. Dunner, Increasing Certainty in Patent 
Litigation: The Need for Federal Circuit Approved Pattern Jury Instructions, 83 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 431, 432–33 (2001) (arguing for the adoption of uniform jury 
instructions for patent cases to reduce unpredictability in decisions); Mark A. Lemley, 
Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 
1934 n.179 (2002) (“[T]he effort to map the words of patent claims to products is 
inherently an uncertain one.”); Michael A. Glenn, Symposium Presentation: Business and 
Patents and Business Patents, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 203, 206 (2000) (“The 
scope of coverage is uncertain. . . . So you don't really know what they cover until they're 
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patent holder are those substantive and procedural rights that 
Congress has dictated and . . . the ‘right to exclude’ others from a 
market and collect monopoly rents is an uncertain right that can 
be represented by a probability that a patent will be found 
valid.”128 Measurements by the USPTO itself and empirical 
results from litigation indicate that a significant amount of 
patent claims are actually invalid.129 As a result, patent rights 
are far less absolute than rights to tangible property.130 
3. The Patent Market Operates Without Reliable Quality 
and Value Benchmarks 
Exacerbating the probabilistic nature of patents is the fact 
that even the degree of probability of patent validity and success 
in litigation is difficult to place anywhere in one of the two 
peripheral percentage quadrants (<25% or >75%), because there 
is very little information in the patent market which is 
discoverable and useful. Reliable transaction information is a 
core tenet of most efficient markets.131 Economist Friedrich 
Hayek argued in The Pure Theory of Capital that the goal of a 
market is the preservation and use of the unique information 
contained in the price of a good.132 Likewise, economist and 
markets theory expert Eugene Fama has stated clearly the role 
of information in an efficient market: 
 
also tested in a court.”); Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Property Rights in 
Information: Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate 
Information, and the Alternative of a Government-Run Reward System, 9 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301, 333 (1998) (“[P]atents . . . are often uncertain as to 
scope.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1083 (1989) (“[T]he scope of patent claims is 
often uncertain until the claims are construed in litigation.”). 
 128 Leffler & Leffler, supra note 124, at 77 (citing Keith Leffler & Cristofer Leffler, 
Want to Pay a Competitor to Exit the Market? Settle a Patent Infringement Case, ECON. 
COMMITTEE NEWSL. (ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Chi., Ill.), Spring 2002, at 26); see also 
Cristofer Leffler & Keith Leffler, Settling the Controversy over Patent 
Settlements: Payments by the Patent Holder Should Be Per Se Illegal, in ANTITRUST LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 475, 487 (John B. Kirkwood ed., Research in Law and Econ. Book Ser. 
Vol. 21, 2004). 
 129 Susan Walmsley Graf, Comment, Improving Patent Quality Through 
Identification of Relevant Prior Art: Approaches to Increase Information Flow to the Patent 
Office, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 495, 500–01 (2007). 
 130 Leffler & Leffler, supra note 124, at 77; see also Kevin D. McDonald, 
Hatch-Waxman Patent Settlements and Antitrust: On “Probabilistic” Patent Rights and 
False Positives, ANTITRUST MAG., Spring 2003, at 68, 73 (noting the inherent uncertainty 
in entrusting the resolution of a technology case to a lay judge or jury); Steven Z. 
Szczepanski, Licensing or Settlement: Deferring the Fight to Another Day, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 
298, 300–01 (1987) (“The chances of prevailing in [patent] litigation rarely exceed seventy 
percent . . . even in that rare case with great prospects.”). 
 131 See generally F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941), reprinted in 12 
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF F.A. HAYEK (Lawrence H. White ed., Univ. Chi. Press 2007). 
 132 Id.  
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[T]he ideal is a market in which prices provide accurate signals for 
resource allocation: that is, a market in which firms can make 
production-investment decisions, and investors can choose among the 
securities that represent ownership of firms’ activities under the 
assumption that security prices at any time “fully reflect” all available 
information. A market in which prices always “fully reflect” available 
information is called “efficient.”133 
However, in a patent market without information 
transparency and benchmarks, and with skewed outcomes 
resulting from bargaining positions dictated by the cost of 
litigation and factors such as secret offsets or the size of the 
parties’ total portfolios, there is very little usable information 
contained in many transactions. Usable benchmarks require 
access to a larger sample size created under at least some 
standard conditions. 
A comparison runs to the real estate market, which operates 
in the United States using the multiple listing service (MLS), a 
central marketplace with useful information and valuation 
benchmarks for brokers and appraisers who, in turn, must be 
certified and work under prescribed guidelines.134 The efficient 
employment of the MLS is supported by a standardized course of 
dealing promulgated by the Real Estate Standards Organization 
that covers transaction data collection, transfer, and 
presentation.135 Federal Circuit Chief Judge Randall Rader has 
recognized the comparison, stating, “realtors can [value 
houses] . . . Why can’t we [value patents]? I know part of the 
answer, of course. . . . [A] real estate market has 20, 30, 40 
comparables on the same block. And you are going to have a 
market to analyze and assess.”136 In the market for patent rights, 
there is no MLS or other central platform or marketplace that 
helps to keep intangibles constant and create benchmarks that 
provide useful information to all market participants.137 Market 
 
 133 Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970), available at http://www.e-m-h.org/Fama70.pdf. 
 134 The MLS is a suite of services that enables real estate brokers to establish 
contractual offers of compensation (among brokers), facilitates cooperation with other 
broker participants, accumulates and disseminates information to enable appraisals, and 
provides a facility for the orderly correlation and dissemination of listing information to 
better serve brokers’ clients, customers, and the public. See, e.g., Multiple Listing Service 
(MLS): What Is It, NAT’L ASS’N REALTORS, http://www.realtor.org/topics/nar-doj-
settlement/multiple-listing-service-mls-what-is-it (last visited May 18, 2015).  
 135 See Association/MLS Executives, REAL EST. STANDARDS ORG., http://www.reso.org/ 
for-mls-executives (last visited May 18, 2015).  
 136 John R. Bone, David A. Haas & David N. Paris, View from the Federal Circuit: An 
Interview with Chief Judge Randall R. Rader, SRR J., Fall 2012, at 100, 101, available at 
http://www.srr.com/assets/pdf/view-federal-circuitan-interview-chief-judge-randall-rader.pdf.  
 137 See, e.g., Ian David McClure, Commoditizing Intellectual Property Rights: The 
Practicability of a Commercialized and Transparent International IPR Market and the 
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dynamics similar to those that have resolved market 
inefficiencies in many industries for hundreds of years simply do 
not exist in the patent market.138 
The patent market is primarily comprised of traditional 
bilateral negotiations and rogue activity.139 The price and terms 
of most transactions are kept confidential.140 In some cases, the 
entity controlling a patent and any third-party beneficiaries of 
the transaction are not revealed—even to the transacting 
parties.141 The lack of transparency and useful information was 
recently highlighted in a letter to Congress signed by sixty law 
professors from twenty-six different states and the District of 
Columbia who teach and write about intellectual property law 
and policy.142 The professors acknowledged that inefficiency and 
abusive patent litigation “thrives due to a lack of reliable 
information about patent rights.”143  
The aforementioned Nortel patent portfolio sale highlighted 
the inability to objectively value patents in a clandestine market. 
Before the auction, multiple independent valuation experts were 
engaged to analyze the portfolio, resulting in valuations reaching 
$1.5 billion.144 Google submitted the “hocus pocus” bids of 
$1,902,160,540 (Brun’s constant),145 $2,614,972,128 (Meissel-Merten’s 
 
Need for International Standards, 6 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 13, 28–29 (2008) (citing 
JOHN TURNER, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS; VALUATION 
TECHNIQUES: PARAMETERS, METHODOLOGIES AND LIMITATIONS 9 (2000), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/sme/en/documents/valuationdocs/inn_ddk_00_5xax.
pdf).  
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 20 (citing Perry J. Viscounty, Michael Woodrow De Vries & Eric M. 
Kennedy, Patent Auctions, Emerging Trend?, NAT’L L.J., May 8, 2006, at S12, available at 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=900005452909/Patent-auctions-emerging-trend). 
 140 Id.; JOHN T. JOHNSON & MICHAEL F. AUTUORO, IP VALUATION 17 (2014), available 
at http://www.aipla.org/committees/committee_pages/IP-Practice-in-Japan/Committee%20 
Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx (follow “2014 MWI Presentations” hyperlink; then follow 
“John Johnson – IP Valuation” hyperlink). 
 141 See generally Letter from John R. Allison et al., Intellectual Prop. Law Professors, 
to the Members of the United States Congress (Nov. 25, 2013), available at 
http://patentlyo.com/media/2014/02/professorsletterontrolls.pdf. 
 142 See generally id. 
 143 Id. at 2. 
 144 See Julie Triedman, With Cleary Presiding, Nortel Patent Auction Could Be 
Biggest Ever, AM. L. DAILY (June 24, 2011, 2:21 PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/am 
lawdaily/2011/06/nortelpatentauction.html (noting pre-auction valuations reaching $1.5 
billion); see also Nortel Bankruptcy Patent Auction Is Biggest Technology Patent Sale Ever, 
FULCRUM INQUIRY (July 2011), http://www.fulcrum.com/nortel_bankruptcy_patent_auc 
tion.htm (“Although the price is breathtaking, it is still a fraction of Nortel’s reported 
15-year investment in those patents of nearly $40 billion. This demonstrates that patents 
cannot be valued correctly using the cost approach.”); Maulin Shah, Varying Kodak Patent 
Valuations Make Auction Price Difficult to Predict, PATENTVUE (July 30, 2012, 6:15 PM), 
http://patentvue.com/2012/07/30/605/ (describing the discrepancy in valuations for the 
Kodak patent portfolio prior to its auction as between $818 million and $4.5 billion).  
 145 See Wild, supra note 117. 
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constant),146 and finally $3.14159 billion (pi).147 With a resulting 
sale price of $4.5 billion, these events make it clear that patent 
valuation lacks the objective benchmarking and market 
comparisons—the complete information—that are needed for an 
efficient market. As will be detailed in the next section, this is 
not a laughing matter, despite Google’s fun. It is one of the key 
characteristics of the patent market which provides perfect 
conditions for exploitation of “lemons” and abusive patent 
litigation—something which Google is adamant about 
combating.148 
4. Adverse Selection and the Patent Market for Lemons 
The catalyst for exploitation of patent market inefficiencies 
and the recent increase in patent litigation is the uncertainty 
surrounding the validity, scope, and value of patents, creating 
what George Akerlof, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economic 
Sciences, coined a “Market for Lemons,” or adverse selection of 
patents.149  
In his classic 1970 article “The Market for Lemons: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” Akerlof focused on the 
automobile market to provide a new explanation for a 
well-known phenomenon: only slightly used cars sell for much 
less than new cars.150 Employing a simple yet powerful model, 
Akerlof assumed that some cars are “lemons” and some are high 
quality. If buyers could distinguish between lemons and high 
quality cars, two separate markets would exist: a market for 
lemons and a market for high-quality cars.151 However, in 1970 
information asymmetries riddled this market: sellers had 
information about the probability that a car was a lemon, while 
buyers did not have general access to this information.152 Under 
these conditions, a buyer knows that there is some probability 
that he is buying a lemon and therefore is willing to pay less 
than he would pay if he knew that he was buying a high-quality 
 
 146 Id.  
 147 Nadia Damouni, Dealtalk: Google Bid “Pi” for Nortel Patents and Lost, REUTERS 
(July 1, 2011, 10:30 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/02/us-dealtalk-nortel-
google-idUSTRE76104L20110702. 
 148 Wal-Mart, Google, Others Back U.S. Bill to Fight ‘Patent Trolls,’ REUTERS (July 
30, 2013, 6:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/30/us-usa-congress-patent-
idUSBRE96T1ER20130730; Susan Decker, Canon and Google Fight to Limit Patent 
Claims, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 17, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-07-
17/google-canon-team-up-in-fight-to-limit-patent-claims. 
 149 See generally Akerlof, supra note 17. 
 150 Id. at 489. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Today, there are tools like CARFAX to create more information parity. See 
CARFAX, http://www.carfax.com (last visited May 18, 2015). 
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car. Furthermore, there is a high cost to finding out the actual 
quality of the car—purchasing and driving the car until it breaks 
down—causing some to refrain from purchasing a car at all.153 
This lowers the price for all used cars—lemons and high 
quality—and encourages sellers of lemons and discourages 
sellers of high-quality cars. Although some sellers would be 
willing to sell high-quality cars at prices buyers would be willing 
to pay for high-quality cars, they will not sell them at a price that 
reflects the risk that the buyer may end up with a lemon, and the 
buyer will not pay the higher price without assurance that it is 
high quality.154 Thus, exchanges that could have benefited both 
buyer and seller failed to take place and efficiency was lost.155 
Note that since 1970 the used car market has introduced 
information symmetries with tools like CARFAX that provide 
objective and standardized information about a car’s history to 
buyers. The used car market has also created additional buyer 
confidence by offering used car warranties.156  
Writing thirty years after he published “The Market for 
Lemons,” in a 2001 Nobel Prize statement George Akerlof 
reflected on the profound reality of the discovery he had made 
and its cross-market application: 
[A]symmetric information was potentially an issue in any market 
where the quality of goods would be difficult to see by anything other 
than casual inspection. Rather than being a handful of markets, the 
exception rather than the rule, that seemed to me to include most 
markets. Thus the paper that I would write would give the automobile 
market as the example, its potential “collapse” as the theorem, and 
then I would discuss how this example would apply to credit and 
insurance.157 
The phenomenon extends to patent rights as well. In the 
market for patents, it is common knowledge that lemons—
patents with invalid claims—exist, but there is no CARFAX-like 
tool, and most, if not all, transactions in which this author has 
 
 153 Akerlof, supra note 17, at 490–92. 
 154 Eventually, as Akerlof surmised would happen, the used car market began 
offering warranties to buyers that raised used car prices to a suitable equilibrium. The 
author of this Article has yet to see any form of such a warranty or representation of 
validity or value in the patent market, and, in fact, most, if not all, transactions in which 
the author has been involved have included express disclaimers of any such warranty or 
representation. 
 155 George A. Akerlof (1940– ), LIBR. ECON. AND LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/ 
library/Enc/bios/Akerlof.html (last visited May 18, 2015).  
 156 See supra notes 152–153 and accompanying text; see also Kelsey Mays, Making 
Sense of Used-Car Warranties, CARS.COM (June 4, 2013), http://www.cars.com/go/advice/ 
Story.jsp?section =buy&story=usedWarranty&subject=warranty. 
 157 George A. Akerlof, Writing the “The Market for ‘Lemons’”: A Personal and 
Interpretive Essay, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Nov. 14, 2003), http://www.nobelprize.org/ 
nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2001/akerlof-article.html. 
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been involved have expressly disclaimed any warranty or 
representation of validity or enforceability. More specifically, 
there is no standard of review and few public benchmarks 
available to help buyers (licensees) make quick and informed 
decisions. As a result, like used cars in 1970, the market for 
patents is restrained, reflecting the problem that any patent may 
be invalid or unenforceable. In addition, the cost and risk 
involved in having a court—the only forum available—determine 
validity, scope, and value is extremely high.158 As a result, some 
lemons are attributed some value—a nuisance value—to avoid 
those costs and risks.159  
Therefore, as a result of (1) the increased recognition of 
patents as a valuable corporate asset, (2) the probabilistic 
inherency of patent rights, and (3) the lack of reliable 
benchmarks or a marketplace or even a standard course dealing 
where low-cost diligence or “casual inspection” can inform 
decision-making, a perfect storm is created around the 
proliferation of uncertainty. As a result, the exploitation of 
patent lemons and adverse selection thrives. The current “patent 
market for lemons” is exploited by one category of market 
participants—NPEs—most efficiently because of a higher 
tolerance for risk resulting from the ability to enforce patents 
without risk of counter-assertion or reputation reduction. The 
storm is real, and consequences have threatened to collapse a 
burgeoning patent market as we know it—at least for the 
speculators.160 
Regardless of the merits of the exploitation of these 
circumstances in the patent market—on which there are many 
different opinions161—it is sufficient for the import of this Article 
 
 158 AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 8. 
 159 Kravets, supra note 14. 
 160 See generally Hearing on Abusive Patent Litigation, supra note 10. The first 
subcommittee hearing on these issues was held on March 14, 2013, and addressed the 
impact of abusive patent litigation by NPEs on innovation and jobs in the U.S., as well as 
potential solutions, such as the SHIELD Act, discovery limits, cost shifting, utilization of 
intervention and impleader rules, staying suits against end-users, alternative damages 
calculations, stricter drafting requirements for patent claims, and mandatory recordation 
of assignments. The witnesses during the hearing were: Mark Chandler, Senior Vice 
President, General Counsel, and Secretary, Cisco Systems, Inc.; Janet L. Dhillon, 
Executive Vice President, General Counsel, and Secretary, J.C. Penney Company, Inc.; 
John G. Boswell, Senior Vice President, Chief Legal Officer, and Corporate Secretary, 
SAS Institute, Inc.; C. Graham Gerst, Partner, Global IP Law Group, LLC; Philip S. 
Johnson, Senior Vice President and Chief Intellectual Property Counsel, Johnson 
& Johnson; Dana Rao, Vice President and Associate General Counsel for Intellectual 
Property Litigation, Adobe Systems, Inc. Id. 
 161 The merits, impact, and even definition of an NPE or “patent troll” has been the 
subject of much academic, industry, and legislative comment over previous years. This 
was highlighted by the recent introduction of Senator Leahy’s bill, the Patent 
Transparency and Improvement Act of 2013, and Representative DeFazio’s bill, the 
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to understand that the growth in recognition of patents as an 
asset class, combined with the abovementioned market 
characteristics, has caused an increase in patent litigation and 
the risk resulting thereof, which, in turn, has initiated the 
development of many new resources, business models, and 
intermediaries to alleviate this risk that did not exist before. 
While the market remains very inefficient, it is by no means as 
inefficient as it once was a decade ago. 
B.  Specialists and Intermediaries Emerge to Facilitate 
Transactions 
The concept of exclusive patent rights is not new. The Greek 
colony of Sybaris granted exclusive rights to inventions as early 
as 500 BC.162 During the Ming Dynasty in China, manufacturers 
of pottery were required to mark their products to ensure quality 
and properly direct complaints.163 In 1474, a Venetian law 
specifically provided for patent rights to instill monetary 
motivations for further invention.164 Of course, our 
forward-looking Founding Fathers were quite aware of the 
significance of new ideas in a flourishing economy.165 The concept 
of patent management, however, is still evolving as a complex 
and sensitive issue. Yet increased risk and uncertainty in the 
patent market has placed new emphasis on patent 
management.166 Because fundamentals of internally handling a 
 
Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act of 2013. For a 
taste of the many perspectives and problematic policy issues in defining an NPE or 
“patent troll” (this author does not condone free use of the “patent troll” term, for reasons 
that should be obvious by reviewing these perspectives), see What Is an NPE?, PAT. 
FREEDOM, https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/background (last visited May 18, 
2015); Brian W. Hannon & Margaret M. Welsh, Challenges of Defining a Patent Troll, 
BLOOMBERG L. (July 29, 2013), http://www.bna.com/challenges-of-defining-a-patent-troll/; 
Joff Wild, It’s Time to Tell the Truth About Trolls, IAM BLOG (Oct. 22, 2013), 
http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=0f3ffd33-f434-40c0-b3bb-6cb3b6ea91a5. 
 162 HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (2d ed. 1995); Edward C. 
Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part I), 
76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 697, 701–04 (1994). 
 163 DAVID S. BLOCH, MONETIZATION OF PATENT AND OTHER IP RIGHTS: AN 
INTRODUCTION 1 (2009), available at http://fordhamipconference.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2010/08/David_Bloch_Monetization_of_Patent_and_Other_IP_Rights.pdf; see also Chinese 
Pottery: The Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), ENCYCOLPÆDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britan 
nica.com/EBchecked/topic/718528/Chinese-pottery/283177/The-Ming-dynasty-1368-1644 
(last updated Feb. 6, 2014).  
 164 Giulio Mandich, Venetian Origins of Inventors’ Rights, 42 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 378, 
379–81 (1960). 
 165 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 166 Efficiency Under Threat for IP Teams as Workload Pressures Continue to Increase, 
Reveals CPA Global IP Industry Survey, CPA GLOBAL (Oct. 27, 2014), https://www.cpa 
global.com/NewsEvents/PressReleases/2014-10-27/Efficiency-under-threat-for-IP-teams-
as-workload-pressures-continue-to-increase-reveals-CPA-Global-IP-industry-survey/ 
(“Reflecting greater global recognition of the value of IP and a trend towards more 
strategic IP management, corporate respondents report that (other than budget/resource 
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complex business matter remain inefficient given that the 
information available is not ideal, independent resources and 
service providers have increasingly held themselves out as 
having the answers. This is the new patent services market.  
The rise in development of these resources began in the early 
2000s, when the first public patent auctions purported to 
demonstrate a liquefying market for patents as an asset class.167 
Operating companies were not prepared to satisfy their own 
patent information needs through internal resources and 
processes, and innovative business models have since grown 
rapidly to meet the demand.168 These resources include 
self-operated software programs designed to help operating 
companies identify problematic patents, and patent management 
and consulting firms that are quite sophisticated in doing this 
work on behalf of an operating entity.  
Since 2000, a competitive and somewhat saturated market 
has become established for self-use software products that 
aggregate publicly available patent data and run algorithms to 
produce useful patent search and evaluation outputs. A 
non-exhaustive list of these tools includes: 
Innography169 
Pantros IP170 
PatentRatings171 
Thomson Innovation172 
Ambercite173 
Google Patents174 
MaxVal-IP175 
Astamuse176 
 
pressures) the factors that are having the most impact on their work include the need for 
greater alignment of IP with business strategy (59%) and increased pressure to 
optimise/monetise IP portfolios (49%).”). 
 167 John Jarosz et al., Patent Auctions: How Far Have We Come?, 45 LES NOUVELLES 
11, 16 (2010), available at http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/Publishing/ 
Articles/Jarosz_Patent_Auctions_How_Far_Have_We_Come.pdf. 
 168 See, e.g., Wang, supra note 108; Mario Benassi & Alberto Di Minin, Playing in 
Between: Patent Brokers in Markets for Technology, 39 R&D MGMT. 68, 69 (2009), 
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.libproxy.chapman.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9310. 
2008.00537.x/pdf. 
 169 See INNOGRAPHY, https://www.innography.com (last visited May 18, 2015).  
 170 See IP.COM, http://ip.com (last visited May 18, 2015). 
 171 See PATENT RATINGS INTERNATIONAL, http://www.patentratings.com (last visited 
May 18, 2015). 
 172 See THOMSON INNOVATION, http://info.thomsoninnovation.com (last visited 
May 18, 2015). 
 173 See AMBERCITE, http://www.ambercite.com (last visited May 18, 2015). 
 174 See GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/?tbm=pts (last visited May 18, 2015). 
 175 See MAXVAL, http://www.maxval.com/patent-tools.html (last visited May 18, 2015). 
 176 See ASTAMUSE, http://www.astamuse.co.jp/en/ (last visited May 18, 2015). 
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Sumobrain177 
PatentBuddy178 
PetaPator179 
Proper use of these products can provide information about a 
patent landscape related to a particular technology, or of a 
company’s patent holdings relative to competitors associated 
with a particular product or research area.180 Many patent 
holding firms, technology companies and manufacturers, and 
even investors use these tools. However, they are not complete 
replacements for human capital and expert review.181 They are, 
in fact, resources that make the human capital required to 
perform effective patent search and expert review of the results 
manageable.182 Supporting this understanding, at least one firm, 
Lex Machina, provides patent litigation data that can help 
potential litigants and other entities weigh probabilities and 
measure potential outcomes based on technology areas, 
jurisdiction, and other inputs.183 
In addition to these self-use tools, which are generally sold 
under a software license, an abundance of patent research and 
consulting firms are new to the market in the past fifteen years 
and provide analytical and technical evaluation services—a 
second-phase step after patent information is gathered. 
A representation of this category of service providers includes: 
IPVision184 
IP Capital Group185 
Evalueserve186 
Red Oak IP, LLC187 
Ocean Tomo, LLC188 
 
 
 177 See SUMOBRAIN, http://www.sumobrain.com (last visited May 18, 2015). 
 178 See PATENTBUDDY, http://www.patentbuddy.com (last visited May 18, 2015). 
 179 See PETAPATOR/ASPATOR, http://petapator.com (last visited May 18, 2015). 
 180 See Wang, supra note 108, at 167–68 (discussing how brokers as an intermediary 
group assist the market by removing information asymmetry and by creating a more 
consistent system for valuation of assets). 
 181 See Jackie Hutter, Free and Low Cost Patent Search and Analysis Tools: Who 
Needs Expensive Name Brand Products?, IP ASSET MAXIMIZER BLOG (June 18, 2013), 
http://ipassetmaximizerblog.com/free-and-low-cost-patent-search-and-analysis-tools-who-
needs-expensive-name-brand-products.  
 182 See Christopher Flagg, There's a Fly in My Soup: Hand-Crafted Research in the 
Age of Analytics, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REV. (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.worldipre 
view.com/article/there-s-a-fly-in-my-soup-hand-crafted-reserach-in-the-age-of-analytics.  
 183 See LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com (last visited May 18, 2015). 
 184 See IPVISION, http://ipvis.com (last visited May 18, 2015). 
 185 See IP CAPITAL GROUP, http://www.ipcg.com (last visited May 18, 2015). 
 186 See EVALUESERVE, http://www.evalueserve.com (last visited May 18, 2015). 
 187 See RED OAK IP, http://redoakip.com (last visited May 18, 2015). 
 188 See OCEAN TOMO, http://www.oceantomo.com (last visited May 18, 2015). 
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Red Chalk Group, LLC189 
TAEUS190 
IPGenix191 
Black Stone IP192 
Chipworks193 
3LP Advisors194 
284 Partners195 
Questel196 
The services provided by these firms include patent search, 
prior art search, infringement analysis, product teardowns and 
reverse-engineering, and patent valuation.197 Acting as an 
extension of the in-house IP strategy role, these companies 
provide services that help a company identify IP risk and value 
and better understand the probabilities presented by that risk 
and value. This information has helped to inform transacting 
parties and, therefore, increase patent asset management.198 
Importantly, these services were generally not available fifteen 
years ago, but this services market is developing rapidly today.199 
As Blaxill and Eckart state: 
[M]arket growth clearly encourages specialisation. But the arrow 
works the other way as well — increased specialisation encourages 
the growth of the market. This creates a virtuous cycle where the 
growing market drives a Smithian division of labour and increased 
division of labour increases the size of the market. . . . [A] wide variety 
of IP-focused transaction specialists have appeared — brokers, 
licensing companies, royalty securitisation companies, contingency 
finance companies, reverse engineering companies, patent data 
providers, patent validation companies, defensive publication 
companies — all focused on supporting the increased number and size 
of transactions.200 
C.  Speculators (NPEs) Have Entered the Market  
For the purposes of this section, a speculator is defined as an 
entity without operations or purpose other than to make profits 
 
 189 See RED CHALK GROUP, http://www.redchalk.com (last visited May 18, 2015). 
 190 See TAEUS, http://www.taeus.com (last visited May 18, 2015).  
 191 See IPGENIX, http://ipgenix.com (last visited May 18, 2015).  
 192 See BLACK STONE IP, http://blackstoneip.com (last visited May 18, 2015).  
 193 See CHIPWORKS, http://www.chipworks.com (last visited May 18, 2015).  
 194 See 3LP, http://3lp.com (last visited May 18, 2015).  
 195 See 284 PARTNERS, http://www.284partners.com (last visited May 18, 2015).  
 196 See QUESTEL, http://www.questel.com/index.php/en/ (last visited May 18, 2015).  
 197 See supra notes 184–196. 
 198 See Wang, supra note 108, at 165–71. 
 199 Of the firms listed, only TAEUS and Chipworks existed prior to 2000, both having 
been founded in 1992 as engineering and reverse-engineering firms, respectively.  
 200 Mark Blaxill & Ralph Eckardt, The IP Marketplace Comes of Age, INTELL. ASSET 
MGMT. MAG., Nov./Dec. 2011, at 46, 48.  
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from the monetization or trade of IP.201 This does not include 
universities, research institutions, or technology companies with 
significant R&D and technology licensing businesses, such as 
Qualcomm (33% of revenue from patent monetization activities) 
or InterDigital (majority of revenue from patent monetization 
activities).202 Nor does this categorization include patent brokers, 
licensing agents, or other intermediaries that do not take at least 
an interest in patent assets that would confer standing to bring a 
patent infringement lawsuit. This section is not focused on those 
for-profit entities that are innovating new business models for 
patent management, such as RPX,203 AST,204 or Unified 
Patents.205 Instead, this section is focused on the pure profit 
motive—the entities that participate in the trade of patents for a 
return on investment, whether their purchase of patents is for 
resale, licensing, or generation of return through litigation. 
These new market participants—NPEs or patent assertion 
entities (PAEs), however they are called—are speculators. 
Speculation in the patent market is not new to the 
twenty-first century. However, as Michael Risch has provided: 
Patents have always been licensed. Patents have always been 
acquired. Patents have even been acquired for the purpose of licensing 
new entrants. In short, there have always been secondary markets. It 
turns out, however, that the current trend of acquiring patents to 
license those already practicing the patent is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, one almost unique in our history.206 
This author proposes that this phenomenon is a direct result 
of the specialists and resources newly available in the 
twenty-first century, highlighted in the last section, which 
provide better information about the current use and value of 
patents. This new focus, of course, has led to new patent 
 
 201 An attempt to define an NPE is an entirely different matter outside the bounds 
and purpose of this Article. See supra note 161. 
 202 See Qualcomm Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 8 (Nov. 7, 2012), available at 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/QCOM/0x0xS1234452-12-371/804328/filing.pdf; 
Press Release, InterDigital Inc., InterDigital Third Quarter 2014 Financial Results 
Driven by 57% Increase in Recurring Revenue (Oct. 30, 2014), available at 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/IDCC/0x0x790056/C2F3A055-C6C8-4546-B757-E9 
039E097174/IDCC_News_2014_10_30_General_Releases.pdf.  
 203 See RPX, supra note 16.  
 204 See ALLIED SECURITY TRUST, supra note 16.  
 205 See UNIFIED PATENTS, http://unifiedpatents.com (last visited May 18, 2015).  
 206 Michael Risch, Licensing Acquired Patents, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 979, 979 
(2014); see also Naomi R. Lamoreaux et al., Patent Alchemy: The Market for Technology in 
US History, 87 BUS. HIST. REV. 3, 4–5, 8–12, 20–22 (2013); Adam Mossoff, The History of 
Patent Licensing and Secondary Markets in Patents: An Antidote to False Rhetoric, 
CENTER FOR PROTECTION INTELL. PROP. (Dec. 9, 2013), http://cpip.gmu.edu/2013/12/ 
09/the-history-of-patent-licensing-and-secondary-markets-in-patents-an-antidote-to-false-
rhetoric/. 
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litigation dynamics. According to a 2013 White House report 
titled “Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation,” NPE suits occur 
when it is too costly or risky for practicing firms to defend 
themselves against claims of infringement, and when certain 
types of patents can be exploited.207 Similar cases occurred 
involving patents for agricultural equipment and for railroad 
equipment in the late nineteenth century.208 In the case of 
agriculture, speculative litigation activity by non-market 
participants has been cited in the late 1860s when the 
Commissioner of Patents (with the support of Congress) issued 
rulings that had the effect of reducing the bar for 
non-obviousness.209 In the 1880s, the Patent Office (again 
supported by Congress) changed the standard back to what it 
had been, and suits by non-practicing patent owners fell 
dramatically.210 In the case of railroad equipment, the late 
nineteenth century was a period of fast-moving, complex 
technical change, making it difficult to determine whether claims 
were novel and non-obvious to a skilled practitioner, giving rise 
to some speculative patent activity. In addition, innovators of 
railroad technologies preferred to focus on expanding the overall 
market for their products by technological cooperation with 
rivals, rather than working to clearly delineate property rights.211 
In this case, speculative activity fell away as: (a) railroad firms 
banded together to fight all claims of infringement (rather than 
settling), and (b) patent claims became narrower and clearer, as 
railroad technology became more codified.212 A key factor in the 
rise of patent assertion by speculators in each of these cases was 
a change in law or technology that led to uncertainty about 
whether a patent had been infringed—for example, the granting 
of large numbers of patents that were broadly written or that 
met only a low standard of non-obviousness. In both instances, 
once the underlying conditions changed, NPE litigation fell 
dramatically because the business model was no longer 
 
 207 PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, NATIONAL ECON. COUNCIL & OFFICE OF 
SCI. & TECH. POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. 
INNOVATION 6 (2013) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE REPORT], available at http://www.white 
house.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.  
 208 Id. at 1.  
 209 Id. at 13. 
 210 Id.; see also Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and 
the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1812 n.15 (2007). See generally 
Lamoreaux et al., supra note 206. 
 211 See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 207, at 1.  
 212 Id.; see also Colleen V. Chien, Assistant Professor, Santa Clara Univ. Sch. Law,  
Patent Assertion Entities: Presentation to the DOJ/FTC Hearing on PAEs (Dec. 10, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314. See generally 
Steven W. Usselman & Richard R. John, Patent Politics: Intellectual Property, the 
Railroad Industry, and the Problem of Monopoly, 18 J. POL’Y HIST. 96 (2006). 
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profitable.213 The difference between speculative patent activity 
in previous periods and the new speculative activity in the last 
fifteen years, however—and what makes the last fifteen years an 
evolutionary stage that will not be made insignificant by new 
patent legislation—is the new existence of sophisticated tools, 
specialists, and intermediaries to allow greater information 
discovery and transaction execution. 
The influx of speculators to the market in the last fifteen 
years is representative of the evolutionary step for IP as an asset 
class because of its proliferation and magnitude of impact. 
Speculator activity in the patent market has increased 
dramatically in recent years.214 In 2012, NPEs brought over 2544 
lawsuits in the United States (61% of all patent suits), compared 
to 1509 in 2011 (45%), and 731 in 2010 (29%).215 James Bessen 
and Michael Meurer have claimed that this activity has cost the 
economy $29 billion in direct costs per year.216 Interestingly, 
according to one source, more than 80% of the patents litigated 
by speculators were traded to them by operating companies.217 
This tells us that the speculative trade of IP rights is not just 
profitable for the speculators, but all market participants. 
III. THE NEXT STEP TO ASSET CLASS STATUS: MARKETPLACES 
FOR EXCHANGE 
Importantly, the emergence of speculators—this being the 
third of five evolutionary stages to tradable asset class status—is 
the current evolutionary stage in which the patent market finds 
itself. It has now moved beyond a market where assets are 
closely held and thinly traded. It has now seen an influx of 
specialists and intermediaries facilitating a greater volume of 
transactions. Speculators have emerged over the past decade, 
exploiting a private, clandestine market without a central 
marketplace to provide transparency and pricing mechanisms.218 
 
 213 See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 207, at 1. 
 214 See Chien, supra note 212, at 23–24. 
 215 Id. 
 216 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes 24 (Bos. 
Univ. Sch, of Law, Working Paper No. 12-34, 2012), available at https://www.bu.edu/ 
law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/BessenJ_MeurerM062512rev062812.pdf. 
But see David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-practicing Entities 
in the Patent System 2–3 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research 
Paper Grp., Research Paper No. 13-01, 2012), available at http://academic.reed.edu/ 
economics/parker/f12/354/brown/Schwartz.pdf (disputing the accuracy of Bessen and 
Meurer’s claims).  
 217 See Companies Are Not Just Victims, LOTNET, http://www.lotnet.com/patent-
assertion-problem/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).  
 218 Ian McClure, The Value of IP as a Commodity, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. MAG., 
May/June 2011, at 29, 29.  
Do Not Delete 6/6/2015 12:16 PM 
2015] From a Market for Lemons to a Marketplace for Patents 795 
As Part III concludes, if the development of other tradable asset 
classes tells us anything, a central marketplace for exchange is 
where the patent market is heading next. 
Part II tells us that the duration of time between the 
emergence of specialists and the development of marketplaces for 
exchange for each of the equities and commodities markets was 
approximately one hundred years and forty years, respectively.219 
This difference can be attributed to the communication advances 
made between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries. 
With the major communication advances between the nineteenth 
and twenty-first centuries, such as the Internet, this time gap is 
likely to be even shorter.  
As was detailed in Part I, specialists entered the patent 
market in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Speculators entered 
the patent market in the late 2000s, or about ten years after the 
specialists. This author predicts that the development of robust 
marketplaces for exchange of tradable patent rights will be 
complete as an evolutionary stage to asset class status before 
2025. Indeed, this movement was begun by a Chicago-based 
marketplace, Intellectual Property Exchange International, Inc. 
(IPXI) which developed a financial exchange for licensing and 
trading patent rights beginning in 2008.220 Although it ceased 
operations on March 23, 2015, due to a legislative and litigation 
environment that proved too difficult to overcome at the time, it 
has paved a way for a patent marketplace to one day flourish.221 
As a membership-based organization with seventy-five members 
at its height, there is obviously an interest and demand for this 
evolutionary step.222  
There is likely a growth period to build familiarity between 
the IP and the exchange world, as empirical evidence shows that 
other exchanges and new tradable products have experienced a 
slow build before large-scale adoption.223 IPXI’s demise is 
additional evidence of the challenge in building a marketplace for 
a new asset class. IPXI developed the first tradable patent 
 
 219 For the purposes of this Article, with respect to equities, it is assumed the influx of 
specialists occurred in the sixteenth century and marketplaces for exchange were formally 
developed in the early seventeenth century in Amsterdam. With respect to commodities, it 
is assumed the influx of specialists occurred in the 1840s and the development of 
commodities futures exchanges was completed in the 1880s. 
 220 See IPXI, FACT SHEET (2013), available at https://www.ipxi.com/public-files/IPXI-
fact-sheet.pdf.  
 221 Joff Wild, IPXI Demise Caused by a US Patent System That Offers No Incentive for 
Good-Faith Licensing, CEO Says, IAM (April 7, 2015), http://www.iam-media.com/ 
blog/detail.aspx?g=93e8d407-b24c-4d9a-a59c-da9fe9e3f578. 
 222 See Malackowski, supra note 1, at 37. 
 223 Id.  
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license product called a Unit License Right (ULR) contract, which 
was offered and sold in a manner not unlike an initial public 
offering of a company.224 The first tradable ULR product was 
issued in June 2013, which involved more than six hundred 
patent assets from Philips related to organic light emitting diode 
(OLED) technology for display screen applications.225 Additional 
offerings were subsequently issued, including those for patent 
bundles covering prepaid debit card technology and Wi-Fi 
technology.226 The contracts were commoditized and tradable in a 
secondary market through a web-based, bid-ask trading 
platform.227 Other entities have sprouted around the world using 
the term “exchange” in their title, although it is not clear that 
these businesses adopt a financial exchange trading model, or 
just an intermediary or brokerage model.228  
Marketplaces purport to provide to the market for patent 
rights what they have provided to equities and 
commodities: price discovery, a real market value for assets, and 
transaction efficiencies.229 Without marketplaces to provide these 
reliable tools and benefits, the market is constrained as a private 
bilateral market.230 As Part II demonstrates, the problem in a 
private bilateral patent market is uncertainty about quality and 
value, and there is little predictability in patent litigation.231 Yet, 
“[p]erhaps the most important factor that is required for the IP 
market to operate efficiently is predictability.”232 The following 
excerpt from Blaxill and Eckardt is spot on: 
When there is little uncertainty in the likely outcomes of an IP 
 
 224 See IPXI, supra note 220.  
 225 See Press Release, IPXI, IPXI Launches First Offering (June 5, 2013), available at 
https://www.ipxi.com/news-events/news/press-releases/105-ipxi-launches-first-offering.html. 
 226 See Press Release, IPXI, IPXI Announces Offerings for Stored Value Card 
Technology (Oct. 9, 2013), available at https://www.ipxi.com/news-events/news/press-
releases/119-ipxi-announces-stored-value-card-technology.html; Press Release, IPXI, IPXI 
Announces Multi-Party Offering for Wireless Communications Standard Essential 
Patents (Oct. 1, 2014), available at https://www.ipxi.com/news-events/news/press-releases/ 
177-ipxi-announces-multi-party-offering-for-wireless-communications-standard-essential-
patents.html.  
 227 See Unit License Right Purchasers, IPXI, https://www.ipxi.com/ulr-purchasers 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2015); see also McClure, supra note 218. 
 228 See JINYONG CHANG, IP TECHNOLOGY TRADING – INNOVATIVE MODEL: TECHNOLOGY 
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dispute, the gap between buyer and seller expectations is small, and 
resolution becomes simple. But when uncertainty is high, the 
distribution of possible outcomes is large, and negotiated agreements 
become much more difficult to achieve.233 
The history of the evolution of asset classes tells us that this 
time is coming soon. IPXI’s growth and proof of concept has 
demonstrated that a robust marketplace for exchange of patent 
rights is practicable and there is demand for a standard course of 
dealing, price discovery, and tradable contracts providing 
opportunities for speculation to investors and predictability to 
operating entities. Moreover, this history tells us that the “patent 
troll” phenomenon that is causing a large uprising in the patent 
world is a necessary step to IP asset class status. It is an 
educational lesson on investment and speculation to the patent 
world, and it will in time be recognized as a period that helped 
grow the patent market and develop robust marketplaces for 
patent rights exchange. 
 
 233 Id. 
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